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Abstract. The quantum inspired State Context Property (SCOP) theory of con-
cepts is unique amongst theories of concepts in offering a means of incorporating
that for each concept in each different context there are an unlimited number of
exemplars, or states, of varying degrees of typicality. Working with data from a
study in which participants were asked to rate the typicality of exemplars of a
concept for different contexts, and introducing an exemplar typicality threshold,
we built a SCOP model of how states of a concept arise differently in associa-
tive versus analytic (or divergent and convergent) modes of thought. Introducing
measures of state robustness and context relevance, we show that by varying the
threshold, the relevance of different contexts changes, and seemingly atypical
states can become typical. The formalism provides a pivotal step toward a formal
explanation of creative thought processes.
Keywords:Associative thought; concepts; context dependence; contextual focus;
creativity; divergent thinking; dual processing; SCOP
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of the shifting relationship between concepts and contexts in different modes of
thought. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 7052: Proceedings of Fifth Interna-
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1 Introduction
This paper unites two well-established psychological phenomena using a quantum-
inspired mathematical theory of concepts, the State-COntext-Property (SCOP) theory
of concepts. The first phenomenon is that the meaning of concepts shifts, sometimes
radically, depending on the context in which they appear [19,13,9]. It is this phe-
nomenon that SCOP was developed to account for [3,4,5]. Here we use SCOP to model
a different though related psychological phenomenon. This second psychological phe-
nomenon was hinted at in the writings of a number of the pioneers of psychology,
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including Freud [17], Piaget [10], and William James [20]. They and others have sug-
gested that all humans possess two distinct ways of thinking. The first, sometimes re-
ferred to as divergent or associative thought, is thought to be automatic, intuitive, dif-
fuse, unconstrained, and conducive to unearthing remote or subtle associations between
items that share features, or that are correlated but not necessarily causally related.
This may yield a promising idea or solution though perhaps in a vague, unpolished
form. There is evidence that associative thinking involves controlled access to, and
integration of, affect-laden material, or what Freud referred to as “primary process”
content [17,18]. Associative thought is contrasted with a more controlled, logical, rule-
based, convergent, or analytic mode of thought that is conducive to analyzing relation-
ships of cause and effect between items already believed to be related. Analytic thought
is believed to be related to what Freud termed “secondary process” material.
A growing body of experimental and theoretical evidence for these two modes of
thought, associative and analytic, led to hypothesis that thought varies along a contin-
uum between these two extremes depending on the situation we are in [7,15,17,3,11,13,14,20].
The capacity to shift between the two modes is sometimes referred to as contextual fo-
cus, since a change from one mode of thought to the other is is brought about by the con-
text, through the focusing or defocusing of attention [11,12]. Contextual focus is closely
related to the dual-process theory of human cognition, the idea that human thought em-
ploys both implicit and explicit ways of learning and processing information [16,8].
It is not just the existence of two modes of thought but the cognitive consequences of
shifting between them, that we use SCOP to model in this paper.
2 The SCOP Theory of Concepts
The SCOP formalism is an operational approach in the foundations of quantum me-
chanics in which a physical system is determined by the mathematical structure of its
set of states, set of properties and the possible (measurement) contexts which can be ap-
plied to this entity, and the relations between these sets. The SCOP formalism is part of
a longstanding effort to develop an operational approach to quantum mechanics known
as the Geneva-Brussels approach [1]. If a suitable set of quantum axioms is satisfied
by the set of properties, one recovers via the Piron-Sole`r representation theorem the
standard description of quantum mechanics in Hilbert space [1]. The SCOP formalism
permits one to describe not only physical entities, but also potential entities [2], which
means that SCOP aims at a very general description of how the interaction between con-
text and the state of an entity plays a fundamental role in its evolution. In this work we
make use of the SCOP formalism to model concepts, continuing the research reported
in [4,5,3,6].
Formally a conceptual SCOP entity consists of three sets Σ, M , and L : the set of
states, the set of contexts and the set of properties, and two additional functions µ and ν.
The function µ is a probability function that describes how state p under the influence
of context e changes to state q. Mathematically, this means that µ is a function from the
set Σ×M ×Σ to the interval [0,1], where µ(q,e, p) is the probability that state p under
the influence of context e changes to state q. We write
µ : Σ×M ×Σ→ [0,1]
(q,e, p) 7→ µ(q,e, p) (1)
The function ν describes the weight, which is the renormalization of the applicability,
of a certain property given a specific state. This means that ν is a function from the set
Σ×L to the interval [0,1], where ν(p,a) is the weight of property a for the concept in
state p. We write
ν : Σ×L → [0,1]
(p,a) 7→ ν(p,a) (2)
Thus the SCOP is defined by the five elements (Σ,M ,L ,µ,ν). States of a concept are
denoted by means of the letters p,q,r, . . . or p1, p2, . . ., and contexts by means of the
letters e, f ,g, . . . or e1,e2, . . .. When a concept is not influenced by any context, we say is
in its ground state, and we denote the ground state by pˆ. The unit context, denoted 1, is
the absence of a specific context. Hence context 1 leaves the ground state pˆ unchanged.
Exemplars of a concept are states of this concept in the SCOP formalism.
Note that in SCOP, concepts exist in what we refer to as a state of potentiality until
they are evoked or actualized by some context. To avoid misunderstanding we mention
that µ(p,e,q) is not a conditional probability of transitioning from state p to q given that
the context is e. Contexts in SCOP are not just conditions, but active elements that alter
the state of the concept, analogous to the observer phenomenon of quantum physics,
where measurements affect the state of the observed entity. Indeed, a SCOP concept
can be represented in a complex Hilbert space H . Each state p is modelled as a unitary
vector (pure state) |p〉 ∈H , or a trace-one density operator (density state) ρp. A context
e is generally represented by a linear operator of the Hilbert space H , that provokes a
probabilistic collapse by a set of orthogonal projections {Pei }. A property a is always
represented by an orthogonal projector Pa in H respectively. The contextual influence
of a context on a concept is modelled by the application of the context operator on the
concept’s state. A more detailed explanation can be found in [4,5].
3 The Study
Our application of SCOP made use of data obtained in a psychological study of the
effect of context on the typicality of exemplars of a concept. We now describe the study.
3.1 Participants
Ninety-eight University of British Columbia undergraduates who were taking a first-
year psychology course participated in the experiment. They received credit for their
participation.
3.2 Method
The study was carried out in a classroom setting. The participants were given question-
naires that listed eight exemplars (states) of the concept HAT. The exemplars are: state
p1: ‘Cowboy hat’, state p2: ‘Baseball cap’, state p3: ‘Helmet’, state p4: ‘Top hat’, state
p5: ‘Coonskincap’, state p6: ‘Toque’, state p7: ‘Pylon’, and state p8: ‘Medicine hat’.
They were also given five different contexts. The contexts are: the default or unit con-
text e1: The hat, context e2: Worn to be funny, context e3: Worn for protection, context
e4: Worn in the south, and context e5: Not worn by a person.
The participants were asked to rate the typicality of each exemplar on a 7-point
Likert scale, where 0 points represents “not at all typical” and 7 points represents “ex-
tremely typical”. Note that all the contexts except e1 make reference to the verb “wear”,
which is relevant to the concept HAT. The context e1 is included to measure the typi-
cality of the concept in a context that simulates the pure meaning of a HAT, i.e. having
no contextual influence, hence what in SCOP is meant by “the unit context”.
3.3 Results
A summary of the participants’ ratings of the typicality of each exemplar of the concept
HAT for each context is presented in Table 1. The contexts are shown across the top, and
exemplars are given in the left-most column. For each pair (a;b) in the table, a repre-
sents the averaged sum of the Likert points across all participants. b is the renormalized
typicality of the state and context specified by the row and column respectively. The
bottom row gives the normalization constant of each renormalized typicality function.
Grey boxes have renormalized typicality below the threshold α= 0.16.
Exp. Data e1 e2 e3 e4 e5
p1 Cowboy hat (5.44;0.18) (3.57;0.14) (3.06;0.13) (6.24;0.28) (0.69;0.05)
p2 Baseball cap (6.32;0.21) (1.67;0.06) (3.16;0.13) (4.83;0.21) (0.64;0.04)
p3 Helmet (3.45;0.11) (2.19;0.08) (6.85;0.28) (2.85;0.13) (0.86;0.06)
p4 Top hat (5.12;0.17) (4.52;0.17) (2.00;0.08) (2.81;0.12) (0.92;0.06)
p5 Coonskincap (3.55;0.11) (5.10;0.19) (2.57;0.10) (2.70;0.12) (1.38;0.1)
p6 Toque (4.96;0.16) (2.31;0.09) (4.11;0.17) (1.52;0.07) (0.77;0.05)
p7 Pylon (0.56;0.02) (5.46;0.21) (1.36;0.05) (0.68;0.03) (3.95;0.29)
p8 Medicine hat (0.86;0.02) (1.14;0.04) (0.67;0.03) (0.56;0.02) (4.25;0.31)
T (e) 30.30 25.98 23.80 22.22 13.51
Table 1. Summary of the participants’ ratings of the typicality of the different exemplars of the
concept HAT for different contexts.
4 Analysis of Experimental Data and Application to the Model
In this section we use SCOP to analyze the data collected in the experiment, and apply
it to the development of a tentative formal model of how concepts are used differently
in analytic and associative thought.
4.1 Assumptions and Goals
We model the concept HAT with the SCOP (Σ,M ,L ,µ,ν) where Σ= {p1, . . . , p8} and
M = {e1, . . . ,e5} are the sets of exemplars and contexts considered in the experiment
(see table 1). We did not consider properties of the concept HAT, and hence L and ν
are not specified. This is a small and idealized SCOP model, since only one experiment
with a fairly limited number of states and contexts is considered, but it turned out to
be sufficient to carry out the qualitative analysis we now present. Moreover, it will be
clear that the approach can be extended in a straightforward way to the construction of
more elaborate SCOP models that include the applicabilities of properties. Note also
that the Hilbert space model of this SCOP can be constructed following the procedure
explained in [5].
Recall how the participants estimated the typicality of a particular exemplar pi,
i ∈ {1, . . . ,8} under a specified context e j, j ∈ {1, . . . ,5} by rating this typicality from
0 to 7 on a Likert scale. Since these ratings play a key role in the analysis, we introduce
the Likert function L:
L : Σ×M → [0,7] (3)
(p,e) 7→ L(p,e) (4)
where L(p,e) is the Likert score averaged over all participants for state p under context
e.
We also introduce the total Likert function T which gives the total Likert score for
a given context:
T :M → [0,56]
e 7→ T (e) = ∑
p∈Σ
L(p,e), (5)
The Likert score L(p,e) is not directly connected to the transition probability µ(p,e, pˆ)
from the ground state of a concept to the state p under context e. However, the renormal-
ized value of L(p,e) to the interval [0,1] provides a reasonable estimate of the transition
probability µ(p,e, pˆ). Hence we introduce the hypothesis that the renormalized Likert
scores correspond to the transition probabilities from the ground state, or
µ(p,e, pˆ) =
L(p,e)
T (e)
(6)
This is an idealization since the transition probabilities are independent although corre-
lated to the renormalized Likert scores. In future work we plan experiments to directly
measure the transition probabilities.
Let us pause briefly to explain why these functions have been introduced. If we
consider the unit context, it would be natural to link the typicality to just the Likert
score. For example, for the unit context, exemplar p1: ‘Cowboy hat’ is more typical
than p6: ‘Toque’ because L(p6,e1)< L(p1,e1) (see table 1). If one examines more than
one context, however, such a conclusion cannot easily be drawn. For example, consider
the exemplar p7: ‘Pylon’, under both the context e2: Worn to be funny and context e5:
Not worn by a person, we have that L(p7,e5)< L(p7,e2), but p7 is more typical under
context e5 than under e2. This is because T (e5)< T (e2), i.e. the number of Likert points
given in total for context e2 is much higher than the number of Likert points given in
total for the context e5. This is primarily due to the fact that Likert points have been
attributed by participant per context.
Note that T (e)8 is the average typicality of exemplars under context e, and the average
transition probability (renormalized typicality) is µ∗ = 18 for all the contexts. We want
to identify the internal structure of state transitions of a concept making use of the
typicality data. Therefore we define a transition probability (or typicality) threshold
α ∈ [0,1]. We say that p ∈ Σ is atypical for context e ∈M if and only if µ(p,e, pˆ)< α.
The transition threshold makes it possible to express that for a given concept and a given
context, there are only a limited number of possible transitions from the ground state to
other states. We express this mathematically by setting the transition probability equal
to zero when it is below this threshold, thereby prohibiting transitions to atypical states.
Eliminating the atypical states modifies the space of possible transitions. It imposes a
new renormalized transition probability distribution µα that is limited to the transition
probabilities above the threshold α. Let
µ∗(p,e, pˆ,α) = µ(p,e, pˆ) if µ(p,e, pˆ)≥ α
= 0 otherwise (7)
We have that µα(p,e, pˆ) =
µ(p,e,pˆ)
µ∗(α) , where µ
∗(α) = ∑8i=1 µ∗(pi,e, pˆ,α). Thus after the
threshold has been imposed, a concept becomes a more constrained structure. At first
glance this may appear to be an artificial bias in our analysis. However, we do not
introduce the threshold to arbitrarily eliminate some exemplars, but to study the evolu-
tion of this biased structure as the threshold changes. We suggest that this may be the
mechanism underlying the shift between associative and analytic thought in contextual
focus.
This leads to the next step, which is to incorporate the two modes of thought into
the model by introducing a threshold-dependent notion of context relevance. The rel-
evance of a context e is associated with both the typicality of the exemplars, and the
transition probabilities. When we impose a threshold α> 0, a context e that has atypi-
cal exemplars may become more relevant if µ(p,e, pˆ) is higher than α for some specific
exemplar p. Indeed, for each exemplar p and context e such that µ(p,e, pˆ) > α we
have that µα(p,e, pˆ) > µ(p,e, pˆ). Thus, the renormalization process induced by α am-
plifies the transition probabilities of the remaining exemplars. In SCOP language this
means the probability of considering exemplar p, which is atypical for the relevant con-
texts (and thus considered a strange exemplar for the concept) could be increased by the
renormalization process if for some context e, p is typical compared to other exemplars,
i.e. µ(p,e, pˆ) is high enough. Therefore, increasing the threshold brings some strange
exemplars into play, as one might intuitively expect for associative thought. We pro-
pose that the threshold variations can be interpreted as shifts in the degree of contextual
focus [3,11,12].
Fig. 1. Transition probability function of contexts The hat and Not worn by a person when α= 0,
the horizontal line at µ(·, ·, pˆ) = 0.16 shows the transition threshold used to identify atypical
exemplars in table 1.
5 Analysis of the Relationship between Contexts and States
5.1 Context Relevance Measure
For each context e ∈M the total Likert score summed across all participants for this
context T (e) could be thought of as a good measure for the relevance of this context
because T (e)8 is the average typicality of the states under context e, and we could think
the higher its average typicality, the more relevant the context is. A closer look reveals
that this is not the case. Indeed, amongst the exemplars there might be few exemplars
p1, ..., pn which are very typical for the context e, such that ∑ni=1L(pi,e) is almost equal
to T (e), but with n much smaller than the total number of exemplars N. Thus almost
all the contributions to T (e) come from this small subset of exemplars. For example,
consider the context e5: Not worn by a person and the unit context e1: The hat. Then we
have 13.51 = T (e5)< T (e1) = 30.3. But most of the contributions to T (e5) come from
the exemplars p7: ‘Toque’ and p8: ‘Medicine Hat’ (note: Medicine Hat is the name of
a city in Canada), because L(p7,e5)+L(p8,e5) = 8.2. On the other hand, T (e1) is the
highest of all total Likert values of all contexts because many exemplars have high Lik-
ert scores. Thus, the values of the renormalized distribution of transitions probabilities
µ(·,e1, pˆ) are spread more homogeneously amongst the exemplars. This creates a flatter
distribution with smaller probability values than the more typical exemplars of the e5
distribution (see figure 1), which means that it is not a very relevant context from the
transition probability perspective. This observation makes it possible to explain how we
can use the transition threshold to gain a clearer picture of what is going on here.
First we introduce the notion of robustness of an exemplar given a certain threshold
and context. Hence, suppose we have introduced a threshold α ∈ [0,1], and consider a
state p ∈ Σ and a context e ∈M , then the robustness R(p,e,α) of p with respect to e
and α is given by
R(p,e,α) = L(p,e) ·µα(p,e, pˆ). (8)
This means that the formula for state robustness compensates for both the Likert score
and the renormalized transition probability induced by the threshold α. The robustness
of a state corresponds to its expected typicality in a traditional probabilistic setting. This
Fig. 2. Relevance of the contexts considered in the experiment, with respect to the threshold α.
provides a means of measuring context relevance, using our state transition probability
model, and where the mode of thought lies on the spectrum of associative to analytic,
determined by the threshold α. For a given context e and a given threshold α we define
the relevance V (e,α) of e by the expected typicality of its states:
V (e,α) = ∑
p∈Σ
R(p,e,α). (9)
Our results reveal an important dependency relationship between the threshold and
the context relevance. Figure 2 shows the function V (e,α) for different values of α for
each context. Consider the contexts e1: The hat and e5: Not worn by a person. The
curves that describe the values of the function V (e,α) are varying in such a way that
when 0 ≤ α ≤ 0.21, V (e1,0) is greater than V (e5,0), and when α > 0.21, V (e5,α)
becomes greater than V (e1,α). This means that for small thresholds, context e1 is the
more relevant of both, while for large thresholds, context e5 is the more relevant. This
is a rather unexpected situation, because context e5: Not worn by a person, is at first
sight not a relevant context for the concept HAT. Recall, however, that the threshold was
introduced with the aim of modelling the associative mode of thought. We can also show
that the other contexts exhibit a similar pattern as these two extreme ones, e1, and e5. For
each pair of contexts, there are two possibilities. The first is that the curve for the less
relevant context at threshold α= 0 crosses the curve for the more relevant context at α=
0 for a certain threshold α> 0. (In figure 2 we note that this situation occurs for the pairs
formed by e5 with e4,e3,e2 and e1, e4 with e2 and e1, and e3 with e2 and e1). The second
possibility is that both contexts decrease together to zero. (In figure 2 we note that this
situation occurs for the pairs formed by e4 with e3, and e2 with e1). This suggests
that we have detected the ingredients of a possible systematic pattern that can lead to
the identification of rare but meaningful associations. We propose that high thresholds
facilitate unexpected associations that arise, for example, in humor and creative word
play, where a concept takes on a new and uncommon meaning. Associative thought in
our framework corresponds to an exemplar p and a context e such that: 1) p is highly
typical with respect to e; 2) p is atypical for the set of most relevant contexts at α= 0;
3) e has a low relevance compared to the set of the most relevant contexts at α = 0; 4)
e becomes more relevant with respect to the more relevant contexts at α = 0 for some
threshold αe > 0.
By increasing the typicality threshold a little above zero, we eliminate the atypical
exemplars for each context. This can be interpreted as entering in a more analytic mode
of thought. However, if we increase the threshold enough, we also eliminate the more
typical exemplars of the most relevant contexts at α= 0 because of the intrinsically flat
nature of the highly rated contexts discussed above. If the threshold is large enough,
we eliminate the most common understanding of the concept, and seemingly irrelevant
contexts at α= 0 become more relevant. Then some exemplars that were not so robust
compared to the most robust exemplars at α = 0 become the most robust ones. These
“robust in a low-rated context” are interpreted as the unexpected meanings that a con-
cept can assume. This is because it is necessary to discard the most relevant meanings
by defocusing attention on the most relevant contexts. This is modelled as increasing α
to retrieve them as typical exemplars.
T (e) # typical Context relevance Type of
exemplars at α= 0 exemplar
Large Large High Very Representative
Medium Large Medium Poorly representative
Medium Small Low Unexpected
Small Small Low Non-representative
Table 2. Types of contexts and the type of exemplars they have.
6 Discussion and Future Directions
This paper builds on previous work that uses, SCOP, a quantum-inspired theory of con-
cepts, and psychological data, to model conceptual structure, and specifically semantic
relations between the different contexts that can influence a concept. Here we focus on
how these contexts come into play in analytic versus associative thought. It is suggested
that the notion of a transition threshold that shifts depending on the mode of thought,
as well as newly defined notions of exemplar robustness, and contextual relevance, are
building blocks of a formal theory of creative thinking based on state transition proba-
bilities in concepts. The model is consistent with the occasional finding of unexpected
meanings or interpretations of concepts. The paper also strengthens previous evidence
that in order to account for the multiple meanings and flexible properties that concepts
can assume, it is necessary to incorporate context into the concept definition.
The model developed here is small and idealized. In future work we plan to extend
and generalize this work. An interesting parameter that we have not yet explored is
the sum of the robustness of a single exemplar with respect to the set of contexts (the
expected typicality of an exemplar w.r.t a set of contexts). We believe that this can be
interpreted as a measure of the exemplar representativeness given in Table 2. Much as
the relevance of any given context is subject to change, unexpected exemplars could
become more or less representative if the transition threshold changes. Further analysis
could provide a richer description of this. Another interesting development would be
study the structure of the transition probabilities when applying succesive renormailza-
tions induced by sequences of thresholds imposed to the concept structure. We could
establish, straight from the data, a threshold-dependent hierarchy of pairs (p,e), that
gives an account of the context-dependent semantic distance between exemplars. This
could be used to model the characteristic, revealing, and sometimes surprising ways in
which people make associations.
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